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The authors provide insights into Canadians' state of retirement
preparedness, not only across income groups, but also within them.
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PENSION PAPERSA key question in Canada’s pensions debate is whether Canadians will be able to maintain
their living standards in retirement, and if policy needs to respond to the risk that some will
experience painful declines.
To date, it has been very difficult to estimate how current trends might affect various
members of the population in the long run. In this study, we used LifePaths – a sophisticated
simulation tool developed at Statistics Canada which integrates a large amount of data on the
socio-economic experience of Canadians – to project consumption before and after
retirement for Canadians who have not yet reached retirement age. In addition to income
from public pension programs, LifePaths integrates saving in and income from registered
pension plans (RPPs) and registered retirement savings plans (RRSPs), and also tracks the
accumulation of equity in housing and its support for consumption later in life.
What makes LifePaths particularly valuable is its ability to model time-varying demographic
and socio-economic patterns on diversified and representative people of various ages over
time. This study focuses on future retirees’ ability to maintain their pre-retirement
consumption after they cease working –benchmarking each individual’s living standards after
retirement to their situation before it – taking into account the diversity and variability of
income, taxation, saving, employment, and family situations over a lifetime. Importantly, 
it gives insights in to state of retirement preparedness, not only across income groups, 
but also within them.
Consistent with other research, the study finds that Canada’s retirement system has supported
post-retirement consumption relatively well, especially for lower-income individuals and
those who reached retirement age in the last twenty years. If ongoing behavior and economic
circumstances were to persist indefinitely, however, more Canadians may find maintaining
their working-life consumption in retirement more difficult. While only about 16 percent of
recent retirees are in circumstances that imply a substantial reduction in consumption post-
retirement, the persistence of recent trends would raise this number over time: 44 percent of
current 25- to 30-year-olds – and a substantial majority of those in the two upper income
quintiles – would risk a marked reduction in their standard of living after retirement. Key
factors behind this projected increase in risk are the fact that Old Age Security benefits, being
indexed to inflation, are projected to lag productivity-driven increases in earnings and the
declining share of private-sector workers participating in RPPs. This trend is robust to
differing assumptions within reasonable ranges for future real wage growth, inflation, rates of
return, RPP coverage and saving rates.
In short, if existing trends and behavior continue, the number of working Canadians at risk
of a significant drop in their living standards in retirement will rise over time. Since, the
projection results vary substantially among generations, earnings groups, and sources of
income, however, policymakers need to assess how the retirement prospects of various groups
would change in response to reforms that seek to mitigate that risk. 
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W
hether Canadians are on a
path to maintain their
living standards in
retirement – taking into account
public-pension benefits, benefit
accruals in registered pension plans,
and purely individual saving – is the
largely unanswered question in
Canada’s pensions debate. 
By international standards and, notwithstanding
the recent financial crisis, compared to the past,
Canada’s stock of tax-deferred saving in registered
pension plans (RPPs) and registered retirement
savings plans (RRSPs) is large. Whether, in
combination with other sources of retirement
income, it is large enough to satisfy Canadians’
expectations for living standards in retirement is
hard to say, however. Even if we knew what those
expectations are, we have typically been forced to
rely on aggregate, average assumptions about
people’s future employment and earnings
trajectories, saving rates, rates of return, and
potential withdrawals to judge what individual or
aggregate stocks of assets will be when the time
comes to begin drawing them down.
The uncertainties involved in assessing
aggregate retirement savings are an order of
magnitude worse when it comes to assessing the
prospects for subsets of the Canadian population.
Statistics Canada’s Survey of Financial Security has
provided two snapshots in the last 25 years – in
1999 and 2005 – of the retirement saving and
pension entitlements of people of various ages and
incomes. Regular surveys of this type, with large
enough samples, especially if linked to data on
individual earnings histories, would go a long way
to providing the information necessary to evaluate
the adequacy of Canadians’ retirement saving with
more confidence, including that of particular
subpopulations. Unfortunately, no such
information exists.
This ignorance matters enormously. There is
widespread concern that Canadians are not saving
enough and that their standards of living may
drop significantly in retirement. If rates of return
remain at levels such as we have recently seen on
yields on high-quality debt securities, the saving
rates needed to achieve standard benchmarks for
income replacement will indeed be very high.
1
Yet the aptness of these standard benchmarks in
general, or for specific groups, is doubtful, and
policies to respond to this concern need a better
knowledge base. 
This paper employs a new tool – Statistics
Canada’s LifePaths model – to simulate the
careers, lifetime saving, and retirement income of
Canada’s population with a high degree of detail
and to project potential consumption possibilities
for future retirees. Its focus is on people’s ability to
consume in retirement compared to their actual
consumption during their working lives – thus it
is a relative measure that takes each individual’s
pre-retirement consumption as the standard. It
finds that, while only about 16 percent of recent
retirees are in circumstances that imply a
substantial reduction in their standard of living
after retirement, the persistence of some recent
trends into the future could result in sizeable
declines in consumption possibilities as time goes
by; in fact, fully 44 percent of current 25- to 30-
year-olds are on track to experience a marked
reduction in their standard of living after
retirement. The most prominent factors for this
projected declining trend are the failure of OAS
benefits to follow the growth of household
earnings, plus an ongoing trend of fewer private
sector workers enjoying coverage under registered
pension plans.
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Because Old Age Security (OAS) and the
Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS), along
with the C/QPP, protect lower-income Canadians
from substantial declines in their standards of
living in retirement,
2 the people these trends
highlight as most at risk of sizeable declines in
consumption after they finish work are those
middle- to high-income individuals who rely on
voluntary savings to the greatest extent. It also
turns out, however, that many at the lower end of
the income spectrum could also be at risk:
although the proportion of newly retired seniors
in the lowest pre-retirement earnings quintile who
have consumption-replacement rates of less than
75 percent is currently almost nil, these
projections show that proportion approaching 20
percent by 2050. 
The sensitivity of projections this far into the
future to assumptions inevitably makes these
conclusions somewhat speculative. The principal
finding of this study, however – that is, a projected
gradual increase in the proportion of future
retirees likely to experience a significant decline in
their standard of living upon retirement – persists
even with differing assumptions for future real
wage growth, inflation, rates of return, RPP
coverage, and future saving rates.
If policymakers judge that risks of large drops
in living standards for various groups in the
population constitute a public-policy problem,
reforms should address behaviour and outcomes
across much of the earnings spectrum.
Pre- and Post-Work Living Standards
of Currently Retired Canadians
A review of what we know about the relative
living standards of Canadians who retired in the
past is a reasonable starting point for exploring
what may happen to currently working Canadians
when they leave employment. In aggregate, the
picture is bright for current retirees. 
The incidence of low-income among Canadian
seniors is low – some 4 percent of retirees,
compared to 13 percent among OECD countries
on average. In addition, the average disposable
income of the Canada’s elderly population is 91
percent of that of the total population, which is
among the highest  in  OECD countries (OECD 2009).
While these measures do not speak to whether
Canadian retirees have been able to maintain their
standard of living in retirement, a relatively bright
picture also emerges from a recent statistical
analysis of post- versus pre-retirement incomes of
Canadian families. Using a rich database of
individuals tracked over a period of 20 years,
LaRochelle-Côté, Myles, and Picot (2008) showed
that, on average, lower-income people experienced
little change in disposable income as they moved
into retirement. Middle-income individuals were
able to replace about 70 percent of peak after-tax
working-age income, while top earners replaced
about 60 percent on average. Looking at family
incomes, which is appropriate if consumption is
shared among household members, they found
that replacement rates were generally 10
percentage points higher.
This same study, however, noted considerable
variation in the retirement income of retirees with
similar working-life disposable incomes. Among
individual retirees aged 69–71 with above-average
working-life income, more than a quarter had
replacement rates lower than 60 percent. Those
able to achieve higher replacement rates usually
relied on some employment earnings early in
retirement (and that raises obvious questions
about what retirement actually means for such
people), supplemented by investment income and,
in later retirement, income from private pensions.
That finding highlights another important
difference in the postwork circumstances of
Canadians with different sources of income.
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Ostrovsky and Schellenberg (2009) found that, on
average, people with no or low RPP coverage were
likely to more than make up for that lack with
earnings from employment or self-employment
and with income from non-registered financial
investments. But these findings demonstrate the
risk of relying on average measures when there is a
lot of variation around the average and the
distribution is not symmetrical. Subsequent
research (Ostrovsky and Schellenberg 2010),
which examined distributions of replacement
rates, showed that the typical experience, that is,
the median replacement rate, of people with RPP
coverage was significantly better than of those
without it. 
Is the experience of current retirees a reliable
guide to the future? Horner (2009) looked at
current saving patterns to estimate what future
incomes in retirement may look like, and he
found that about 30 percent of modest- to high-
income households are not likely saving enough to
avoid a significant drop
3 in their standards of
living in retirement. While Horner’s work looked
at home equity, small-business equity, and non-
registered savings assets, each of which is
important for some retired individuals (Brown,
Hou, and Lafrance 2010; Ostrovsky and
Schellenberg 2009), the available data make it
difficult to draw strong conclusions about these factors. 
Since Horner’s study relied on a single year of
cross-sectional tax data, it required strong
assumptions about the rest of an individual’s
career, both the past and the future; essentially it
assumed that an individual’s earnings, RPP
coverage, contributions to RRSPs, and family
demographics in 2006 are fully representative of
his or her entire career. But one year’s data cannot
properly capture the dynamics and diversity of a
person’s actual life course. Actual retirement
income is a cumulative function of an individual’s
employment, earnings, RPP coverage, and
individual savings over an entire career, and there
is often tremendous variability in each of these factors.
Not enough is known about Canadian workers’
cumulative retirement saving to date, but their
future saving behaviour is even more uncertain. It
is often assumed that current behaviour will
continue. However, in order to make projections
of future retirement saving and its adequacy, it is
critical to have an appreciation of the underlying
cohort trends relating to employment, earnings,
and saving in various forms; simply extrapolating
current saving outcomes may not be appropriate. 
The declining trend in RPP coverage and the
shift from defined-benefit to defined-contribution
or hybrid plans for those with coverage, for
example, may mean that pensions are more fully
funded and thus likelier to be paid; however, from
the individual retiree’s point of view, they make
future retirement income (rather than
contributions from current workers) sensitive to
financial-market volatility and investment returns.
The recent advent of TFSAs will also very likely
play an increasingly important role in shaping the
saving behaviour of working Canadians. That is
because, for many taxpayers, TFSAs are a more
tax-efficient retirement-saving vehicle than
traditional tax-deferred accounts (Laurin and
Poschmann 2010). 
In addition to the deficiencies in our knowledge
about the existing retirement savings of Canadian
workers, and the uncertainties associated with
projecting their future saving, there are broad
uncertainties about the future of the economy,
such as wage growth, rates of return, and inflation,
as well as uncertainties about future government policy.
Many economists expect that as population
aging restrains the growth of labour supply in
years ahead, GDP growth will be slower than in
recent decades. The demographic shift may also
depress rates of return on real and financial assets.
Firstly, returns on investments are in the long term
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dependent on real economic activity, which again
is likely to grow at a slower pace with an ageing
workforce. Secondly, an ageing population also
means that the pool of individuals living on
retirement income – and thus, on average, net
sellers of assets – will expand at a faster pace than
the pool of younger workers, who are net buyers
of assets. This demographic effect on asset markets
may dampen future rates of return (Takáts 2010).
The LifePaths Model
Statistics Canada’s LifePaths microsimulation
model provides important insights into this
research question and overcomes many limitations
of the existing research. LifePaths can robustly
project the retirement incomes from public and
registered sources, and home equity, for past and
future retirees and can identify individuals likely
to experience a significant decline in their
standard of living after retirement. It is also a
powerful tool for evaluating the importance of key
risks and uncertainties.
4
LifePaths is a publicly available microsimulation
model of individuals and families, designed
primarily for analysis and development of
government policies that have a longitudinal
dimension. It creates detailed individual life
histories by using behavioural equations estimated
from a wide variety of household survey and
administrative data (described in Box 1). The
resulting synthetic population is representative of
Canada’s population and its historical evolution, is
consistent with available microdata, and has been
constructed to adequately reproduce aggregate
population statistics. 
C.D. Howe Institute
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transfer system.
LifePaths integrates a tremendous amount of microdata and
aggregate data on the socioeconomic experience of Canadians. 
Key data sources used to develop the model are historical
demographic estimates of population, immigration, emigration,
fertility, and mortality, census microdata from 1971 to 2006,
longitudinal Labour Force Survey data from 1976 to 2005, Family
History surveys from 1984 to 2001, administrative data on
postsecondary education, the 1999 and 2005 Survey of Financial
Security (SFS), and longitudinal and/or cross-sectional taxation data
from 1980 to 2007. Many other data sources have also been used to
a lesser degree. 
For the simulation of retirement income and the determination
of consumption replacement outcomes, an individual’s earnings
history is particularly important. The streams of lifetime saving and
the corresponding accumulation of wealth in an individual's RRSPs
and/or RPPs and in the form of home equity are also crucial
components of such an evaluation. The key data underlying the
equations that produce individual earnings histories in LifePaths are
a longitudinal version of the 1976-2004 Labour Force Surveys, and
census data from 1981 to 2001. The resulting earnings histories
have been calibrated and validated using various longitudinal tax
data sources. 
The likelihood that a simulated individual accrues benefits in an
RPP during his or her lifetime, and the size and characteristics of
those benefits, are modelled from a number of data sources.
Equations linking the socioeconomic characteristics of individuals
and their likelihood and type of RPP coverage have been estimated
from the 1999 SFS. The number of individuals accruing an RPP
benefit in a given year, broken out according to birth cohort, age,
and earnings, has been established from taxation microdata from
1991 to 2006, supplemented by data from the Pension Plans in
Canada Survey from 1977 to 2007 The 1971 to 1996 censuses have
been used to infer trends in RPP coverage for older cohorts.
LifePaths’ modelling of RRSP saving and accumulation relies on
longitudinal tax microdata on RRSP contributions and withdrawals
from 1990 to 2001 and on cross-sectional tax microdata from 1968
to 2007. Gross market rates of return to various asset classes have
been taken or derived from Statistics Canada’s CANSIM database,
Tables 176-0041 and 176-0043, “Financial Market Statistics.”
Differences between gross market rates of return and those actually
received by individuals have been estimated by roughly calibrating
aggregate RRSP stocks to be consistent with the SFS for 1999 and
2005. The distributions of household RRSP wealth produced by
LifePaths have been validated using data from the 1999 and 2005 SFS.
The retirement income received by individuals from RPPs and
RRSPs in LifePaths’ simulations has been validated with taxation
data from 1990 to 2006.
LifePaths' modelling of home ownership and home equity relies
on 1981 to 2006 census data, linked longitudinal income-tax and
property-tax assessment data, and the 1999 and 2005 SFS.
Box 1. Data Sources for LifePaths
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LifePaths models individual-level fertility,
mortality, family demographics, education,
employment, earnings, most taxes and transfers
(including public pensions), savings in RRSPs and
RPPs, and the accumulation of equity in owner-
occupied homes. Rather than merely producing
average results, therefore, it generates a range or
distribution of individual outcomes.
LifePaths models individuals’ retirement income
and ability to maintain pre-retirement living
standards for historical retirement cohorts by
using socioeconomic parameters and behavioural
equations estimated from several data sources.
These successfully reproduce the actual historical
experience of individual Canadians in detail and
typically include cohort and period effects. Many
assumptions underlie a projection scenario. Except
where specific alternative assumptions are made, it
has been generally assumed that future
socioeconomic outcomes are consistent with the
cohort trends visible in the most recent data.
LifePaths incorporates considerable detail on
the historical evolution of various retirement-
income programs and the income and payroll tax
systems. For these projections, it is assumed that
public pensions, and the income-tax and payroll
tax systems, including the provisions for RPPs and
RRSPs,  will remain as currently legislated. Public-
pension benefits and many elements of federal and
provincial income taxes (tax brackets, tax credits,
etc.) remain indexed to the consumer price index
(CPI). The yearly maximum limit for pensionable
earnings under the CPP and QPP (YMPE)
continues to be indexed to the growth of the
average industrial wage.
The following assumptions  in the projection
scenario chosen for this study are of particular note:
￿ Real wages will grow at 1.3 percent annually (the
assumption for real wage growth made by the
Chief Actuary of Canada in the most recent
Actuarial Report of the Canada Pension Plan)
(Canada 2010).
￿ CPI inflation will be 2 percent annually (reflecting
the Bank of Canada’s target). 
￿ There will be a trend to lower private-sector RPP
coverage and a continuing movement from
defined-benefit to defined-contribution plans in
the private sector.
￿ Future real-market rates of return of the various
asset classes held by RRSPs and defined-
contribution RPPs are based, as a starting point,
on their historical averages over the last 72 years –
roughly 4 percent in aggregate. In LifePaths,
individuals receive a reduced rate of return,
reflecting investment-management and other costs
and individual-level performance penalties that are
not well understood but are implied by the
aggregate data on RRSP pre - retirement tax flows,
market rates of return and RRSP wealth in the
1999 and 2005 Survey of Financial Security. The
base assumption is that the net real rate of return
received by individuals in the future is roughly 1
percent for RRSPs and 2.5 percent for defined-
contribution RPPs.
5 Note that these are aggregate
rates of return: LifePaths actually models portfolio
composition and rates of return stochastically at
the level of the individual.
￿ Individuals’ homes appreciate at 2.65 percent
(nominal) per year in the future, the midpoint
between the assumptions for nominal inflation
and nominal wage growth. 
￿ Most homeowners will reach retirement age
having largely paid off their mortgages (consistent
with the distribution of home-equity ratios at age
65 in the 1999 and 2005 Survey of Financial
Security). 
We stress that these assumptions produce 
a conditional projection. If the future
socioeconomic behaviour of younger workers,
including their saving rates, is substantially
different from that implied by historical and
current trends, the results could be quite different
from those projected in this study. For example,
individuals’ saving rates may change as people
update their projections about their own
retirement. We discuss the impact of some
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alternative assumptions, including those for 
saving behaviour, at the end of the study, 
under “Sensitivities.”
We should also note limitations with respect to
the treatment of defined-benefit pension plans,
including defined-benefit RPPs and the C/QPP.
The funding status of these plans is not modelled
in LifePaths. Our projections assume that future
employee contributions and benefit levels will
follow their historical trends and that any changes
in employer contributions required to reconcile
contributions and benefits will not affect current
compensation or income growth. If rates of return
stay persistently low, however, defined-benefit
plans, including the C/QPP, would experience
funding deficiencies. In that case,  benefits would
be lower than projected, thus lowering
consumption in retirement, and/or  contributions
would be higher than projected, which might
reduce pre-retirement consumption.
Benchmarking Living Standards in
Retirement 
Most discussions of living standards in retirement
compared to those enjoyed during working life
refer to gross earnings replacement. One
commonly used rule of thumb is that a gross
retirement income equal to roughly 70 percent of
gross pre-retirement earnings allows individuals to
maintain their standard of living after retirement.
This rule is arbitrary and ignores the substantial
differences among individuals in the relationship
between gross income and consumption. LifePaths
facilitates an attempt to measure individuals’
consumption-replacement rates more directly.
More specifically, consumption-replacement rates
have been estimated in the following manner.
Consumption-replacement rate=
Potential retirement consumption 
Proxy for actual pre-retirement consumption
Potential retirement consumption is an
individual’s after-tax income, at age 70, from
OAS, C/QPP, the GIS, RPPs, and RRSPs, plus
the “imputed rent” from home ownership and the
amortization of 50 percent of an individual’s
home equity. It does not include income from
work: while employment income does support the
consumption of many Canadian seniors, the
explicit focus on living standards after work ceases
precludes it as an income source. Although
LifePaths does not model the timing of retirement
per se, underlying trends produce increasing
labour force participation after traditional
retirement age in the future.
Proxy for actual pre-retirement consumption is
gross earnings plus imputed rent, less payroll and
income taxes, less net retirement saving in RPPs
and RRSPs, less payments of mortgage principal.
This is a “prime working age” measure of
consumption; it averages each individual’s “best”
15 years between ages 35 and 60 and is indexed
for inflation.
As noted, both the replacement-rate numerator
and denominator include a measure for imputed
rent. People with equity in their homes enjoy a
flow of income or consumption services, usually
referred to as imputed rent, that should be
recognized and included as a source of income or
consumption; this study relies on the approach
used by Brown, Hou, and Lafrance (2010) to
estimate it. The amount of imputed rent received
by an individual is a function of the size of his or
her home equity; the 50 percent of home equity
that is not already being amortized in the
numerator provides a flow of imputed rent.
Both the numerator and denominator are
calculated on a single-adult-equivalent basis by
summing the values for the two spouses, where
applicable, and then using an equivalency scale to
adjust for family size (spouses plus dependent children).
Under “Sensitivities” we discuss the
consumption-replacement-rate methodology
further; we test the sensitivity of the findings to
some alternative choices and assess the omission of
C.D. Howe InstituteCommentary 317 | 7
some elements of saving and net worth from the
calculation of replacement rates.
The use of a proxy for pre-retirement
consumption allows a straightforward target for
individuals to avoid a reduction in their standard
of living after retirement, that is, a consumption-
replacement rate of 100 percent. Other studies
have typically used thresholds of 100 percent or
90 percent in their analysis (Munnell, Webb, and
Delorme 2006; Horner 2009). Some would
consider full replacement of consumption in
retirement from public pensions, registered
sources and home equity as an overambitious goal.
Cessation of work ends some expenses, and some
argue that, whereas  some costs increase with age,
the net costs of many activities tend to decline.
Moreover, some analyses of the CPI (for example,
Rossiter 2005), which we use to convert nominal
dollar amounts into real-consumption
possibilities, suggest that it overstates increases in
the cost of living, which would also justify using a
more conservative replacement ratio. The use of a
more conservative 75 percent replacement
threshold also provides a counterbalance to the
fact that some forms of saving are not explicitly
incorporated into the analysis. These
considerations, plus a sense that declines in living
standards in retirement need to be significant to
raise public policy concerns, leads us to use a
consumption-replacement threshold of 75 percent
as a benchmark for potentially disruptive declines
in living standards in retirement. 
The next section of the study evaluates the
consumption-replacement outcomes of the
Canadian retirement-income system by using
LifePaths. We present results first for recent
retirees, that is, those reaching retirement age
between 2006 and 2010. Then the timeframe
expands to encompass persons reaching retirement
age between 1966 and 2050 in order to examine
the historical and projected future evolution of
potential consumption replacement in retirement. 
We look at various consumption-replacement
measures: average replacement rates, both by
specific source of retirement consumption and
overall, as well as entire distributions of
replacement rates and the proportion of
individuals below certain replacement thresholds,
with particular emphasis on those with less than
75 percent replacement. An examination of the
distribution of replacement rates allows a focus on
subgroups of particular interest – in this case,
those individuals at risk of low consumption
replacement in retirement. 
The Projections and Simulations 
The 2006-2010 Retirement Cohort 
Figure 1 shows the stacked average consumption-
replacement rates by source and by pre-retirement
earnings decile for recently retired workers, that is,
those reaching age 66 between 2006 and 2010.
Average total replacement rates for the bottom
seven deciles of this cohort equal or exceed 100
percent. Average total replacement rates decline as
pre-retirement earnings increase; they are well over
100 percent for the bottom deciles but fall to 77
percent for the top decile. Only average RPP
replacement rates increase with earnings.
Interestingly, average RRSP replacement rates are
very flat across most of the pre-retirement earnings
distribution. All public sources of retirement
income and home equity provide replacement
rates that fall with pre-retirement earnings.
As noted, average replacement rates obscure the
underlying variability in the replacement rates of
individuals. This is particularly true for single
sources of retirement income. Figure 2 shows the
distribution of replacement rates from RPPs for
recent retirees with pre-retirement earnings
between the 60th and 80th percentiles.
Fewer than a fifth of these individuals have RPP
replacement rates of 50 percent or greater. Some 8
percent have no family income from RPPs, and
the RPP replacement rates of the remaining
individuals are widely distributed,  most falling
between 10 and 50 percent.
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Pre-retirement Earnings by Decile
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Figure1: Stacked Average Replacement Rates by Component and Pre-Retirement Earnings (2006-2010 Retirement Cohort)
Sources: Statistics Canada LifePaths Model and authors’ calculations. 
Figure 2: Distribution of RPP Replacement Rates by Size (60th-to-80th percentile, 2006-2010 retirement cohort)
Sources: Statistics Canada LifePaths Model and authors’ calculations. Commentary 317 | 9
Figure 3 moves to the distribution of total
replacement rates for all recent retirees. As one
might expect, individual total replacement rates
are somewhat less variable than those from single
sources of retirement income since one source
often offsets others. Nevertheless, significant
variability remains.
More than half of recent retirees appear to be
capable of maintaining their consumption after
retirement, and a further sizeable minority are
experiencing only a fairly modest reduction.
Overall, roughly five in six individuals appear to
have consumption possibilities of at least 75
percent, and four in five of at least 80 percent.
6
Cohorts Retiring from 1966 to 2050
Average Replacement Rates
We now turn to historical and projected future
trends in rates of consumption replacement
provided by retirement income from public
pensions, registered sources and home equity.
Figure 4 shows the trends in the average
replacement received from public pensions,
broken out by retirement cohort and component.
The vertical dotted line divides historical and
future retirement cohorts. The average
replacement rate from “all public pensions”
increased steadily across cohorts reaching normal
retirement age from 1966 to 1988 and peaked in
1988 at about 57 percent. It has since declined to
46 percent for recent retirees and is projected to
continue declining for future retirees. 
The dominant reason for the downward trend
in the “all public pensions” replacement rate is the
steadily declining replacement provided by OAS
benefits. The pre-retirement consumption of these
cohorts has increased steadily in real terms over
the past 50 years, a trend that is projected to
continue (albeit more modestly) thanks to
increasing labour-market participation by women
and assumptions of future wage growth that
outpaces inflation. 
The other trend of particular note is the
substantial increases in average rates of
replacement provided by C/QPP for cohorts
reaching retirement age from 1966 to 1988; 
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Figure 3: Distribution of Total Replacement Rates by Size (2006-2010 Retirement Cohort)
Sources: Statistics Canada LifePaths Model and authors’ calculations. 
6 This finding seems reasonably consistent with those of other studies for recent retirees, notably LaRochelle-Côté, Myles, and Picot (2008)
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for these cohorts, this trend more than offset the
declining OAS replacement rates and produced
increasing “all public pension” replacement rates.
This increase in C/QPP replacement rates across
these cohorts was caused by the phase-in of full
CPP benefits during the plan’s first decade of
operation and the equivalent for QPP benefits
over two decades, in combination with rapid
expansions of the YMPE between 1974 and 1986.
But for cohorts reaching retirement age since
1988, the average C/QPP replacement rate has
been gradually declining, a trend which appears to
reflect the fact that individuals are entering the
workforce later than previously and leaving it
earlier. Average C/QPP replacement rates are
projected to continue declining modestly for
cohorts retiring over the next 20 years. The
forthcoming changes in the actuarial adjustments
for early or late take-up of C/QPP benefits have
not been modelled.
Similar measures are shown in Figure 5 for the
other components of the retirement-income
system modelled in LifePaths: RPPs, RRSPs, and
home equity. It should be recalled that the
replacement rate from home equity includes both
the stream of consumption or “imputed rent”
received by homeowners and the assumed
drawdown of 50 percent of a homeowner’s equity,
amortized over the course of his or her retirement.
Average combined consumption replacement
from these sources increased steadily over the
historical period, from a low of some 35 percent
for the earliest retirement cohorts shown to a
recent high of 56 percent. However, this trend is
projected to reverse for all future retirement
cohorts, with combined replacement rates
dropping steadily and reaching 45 percent for
individuals who reach retirement age in 2050.
Several factors underlie this projected decline.
Average RPP replacement rates rose steadily across
historical retirement cohorts, peaking at 30
percent for the 2001-5 cohort; they decline
modestly for the most recent retirement cohort
and are projected to continue declining for future
cohorts and to reach a floor at roughly 20 percent
for cohorts reaching retirement age after 2040.
These trends reflect the observed expansion and
then contraction of RPP coverage of the labour
force over the historical period, as well as the
assumption that future private-sector RPP
coverage will continue to decline moderately. 
The historical and projected trends in home-
equity replacement rates reflect historical trends
and future assumptions for home ownership,
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Figure 4: Average Public Pension Replacement Rates by Component and Retirement Cohort, 1966-2050
Sources: Statistics Canada LifePaths Model and authors’ calculations. Commentary 317 | 11
It has been assumed that home-ownership rates
will remain at recent levels, that home prices will
increase annually by the midpoint of inflation 
(2.0 percent) and nominal wage growth (3.3 percent),
and that the majority of homeowners in future
retirement cohorts will reach retirement with little
or no remaining mortgage debt (as did retired
individuals in the 1999 and 2005 Survey of
Financial Security). 
In part, the historical trend of increasing
average RRSP replacement rates is due to the
ongoing maturation of this program after its
introduction in 1957. Successive retirement
cohorts have access to RRSP saving over
progressively larger portions of their careers. In
addition, annual RRSP participation rates
increased steadily after the introduction of the
program, especially in the early to mid-1990s,
following a comprehensive reform of RRSP limits.
The flattening of average RRSP replacement rates
for recent and future retirees reflects the
moderation in RRSP saving observed in the past
decade; these projections assume that these recent
levels of RRSP participation will continue into the future.
The average replacement rates from all these
separate components are stacked in Figure 6 to
provide a comprehensive picture of the trends in
total replacement rates and their composition.
Average total replacement rates increased steadily
across cohorts retiring in the historical period,
peaking at roughly 105 percent for the 2001-5
cohort. The average total replacement rate
declined slightly for the most recent retirees.
Integrating existing data on current workers’
socioeconomic experience to the present with
projections of the remainder of their lifecourses,
based on historical and current trends, yields
steady and substantial declines in replacement
rates for future retirement cohorts, falling to
roughly 75 percent for individuals reaching
retirement age in 2050. 
Distribution of Replacement Rates 
Figure 7 compares the distribution of total
replacement rates for the 2006-2010 retirement
cohort with that projected for the 2046-50
cohort. The contrast is stark. Only 25 percent of
the 2046-50 retirement cohort are projected to
have replacement rates from public pensions,
registered sources, and home equity of 100
percent or greater, compared to 55 percent of the
2006-10 retirement cohort. Making reference to
our 75-percent benchmark for potential
consumption replacement from these sources,
more than four in ten individuals in the 2046-50
Independent ￿ Reasoned ￿ Relevant C.D. Howe Institute 

































































Figure 5: Average Replacement Rates from RPPs, RRSPs and Housing Equity by Retirement Cohort, 1966-2050
Sources: Statistics Canada LifePaths Model and authors’ calculations. | 12 Commentary 317
retirement cohort are projected to experience a
drop in consumption possibilities larger than 25
percent, compared to only about one in six
individuals in the 2006-10 cohort.
This analysis is extended across all retirement
cohorts in Figure 8. Since it is difficult to  show
the complete distribution of replacement rates
across many cohorts, we show more summary
measures, namely, the proportions of individuals
with a total replacement rate under three different
thresholds –100 percent, 75 percent, and 50 percent. 
Since, for the reasons elaborated above, a
consumption-replacement rate of less than 100
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Figure 6: Stacked Average Replacements Rates by Component and Retirement Cohort, 1966-2050
Sources: Statistics Canada LifePaths Model and authors’ calculations. 
Figure 7: Distribution of Total Replacement Rates by Size and Retirement Cohort
Sources: Statistics Canada LifePaths Model and authors’ calculations. Commentary 317 | 13
fall in living standards, we include this threshold
primarily as a reference point. As previously
noted, we see individuals with a consumption-
replacement rate under 75 percent as at risk of a
significant decline in their standard of living after
retirement. Individuals with a replacement rate of
less than 50 percent would seem likely to
experience a very substantial drop in their
standard of living. 
For recent retirees, the proportion of individuals
with replacement rates under 100 percent is
roughly 44 percent. The proportion with less than
75 percent consumption replacement is much
smaller, however, at about 16 percent, and very
few recent retirees, fewer than 3 percent, have
replacement rates under 50 percent.
The trends in these measures are similar,
differing mainly in degree, and they correspond to
the opposite trends seen in average total
replacement rates in Figure 6. Over most of the
historical period, as average replacement rates for
retiring cohorts were increasing, the proportion of
these cohorts with replacement rates under these
thresholds fell. For recent retirees, this trend has
started to reverse. The proportion of individuals
not meeting a given replacement threshold
increases markedly across future retirement
cohorts (Figure 8) and at a greater rate than the
decline in average total replacement rates.
The proportion of individuals who appear likely
to experience less than 75 percent consumption
replacement in retirement is shown broken out by
pre-retirement-earnings quintile in Figure 9. The
proportion of individuals below this threshold
increases substantially as pre-retirement earnings increase.
This finding is not surprising because the public
pension system, which is mandatory and has
nearly universal coverage, provides high levels of
consumption replacement to individuals with low
pre-retirement earnings. The higher a person’s
earnings, the more voluntary saving by the
individual (and/or his or her employer) through
RPPs, RRSPs, home equity, or other instruments
is needed to replace consumption in retirement. 
The projected trend of large increases in the
proportion of future retirement cohorts with low
replacement rates holds across the entire pre-
retirement earnings spectrum. Over time, the pre-
retirement consumption of all cohorts is projected
to rise in real terms, supported by rising
household earnings - although they are projected
to increase at a slower pace than in the past 40
years. These higher living standards during
working life will be, on average, more difficult to





































































Figure 8: Proportion of Population Falling Below Various Total Replacement Rate Thresholds by Retirement Cohort, 1966-2050
Sources: Statistics Canada LifePaths Model and authors’ calculations. | 14 Commentary 317
replace in retirement. While almost no one  in the
bottom quintile of the most recent retirement
cohort has replacement rates below 75 percent, it
is projected that almost 20 percent of the bottom
quintile of the 2050 retirement cohort will. 
Sensitivities 
How sensitive are these findings to some of the
methodological choices made and to some of the
more significant assumptions made about future
socioeconomic parameters? Clearly, very large
differences in methods and assumptions could
C.D. Howe Institute
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Figure 9: Proportion of Population with Total Replacement Rate <75% by Pre-Retirement Earnings Quintile 
and Retirement Cohort, 1966-2050
Sources: Statistics Canada LifePaths Model and authors’ calculations. 
Figure 10: Proportion of Population with Total Replacement Rate <75% by Pre-Retirement Earnings Quintile 
and Retirement Cohort, 1966-2050
Sources: Statistics Canada LifePaths Model and authors’ calculations. Commentary 317 | 15
produce quite different results. The principal
finding of this analysis – that is, the projection of
substantial increases in the proportion of future
retirees with low levels of consumption
replacement – persists, even with alternative
methodologies and assumptions. 
Pre-retirement Standard of Living 
A critical methodological issue in designing a
replacement-rate measure is the choice of a period
to benchmark pre-retirement living standards.
Annual pre-retirement consumption tends to be
considerably more stable than annual earnings,
but it still varies significantly over the life course.
Should the retirement-income system be evaluated
by whether it replaces an individual’s peak life-
course consumption? This is the standard implied
by many defined-benefit RPPs, which provide
pensions based on final average earnings. An
alternative is to calculate a broader, “career-
average” standard for pre-retirement consumption.
The approach taken in  this study has been to
average each individual’s best 15 years of
consumption between ages 35 and 60. This
excludes the early portion of individuals’ careers,
when their consumption is often much lower than
their “prime-working-age” consumption, and it
also avoids “cherry picking” a small number of an
individual’s years of highest consumption.
Figure 10 tests the sensitivity of the results to
the choice of measurement period for pre-
retirement consumption, comparing a narrower
“peak- career” measure (best 5 out of the final 10
years before retirement) and a broader career-
average measure (best 25 out of the final 40 years
before retirement) to the base specification.
Not surprisingly, the incidence of replacement
rates below 75 percent is very sensitive to the
measurement period used for pre-retirement
consumption, particularly for cohorts that
experienced, or are projected to experience,
substantial growth in average real wages over the
course of their careers. By contrast, the trends in
historical and projected replacement rates are not
particularly sensitive to this methodological
choice. The projected future trend of substantial
increases in the prevalence of replacement rates
below 75 percent is not sensitive to different
measurement periods for pre-retirement consumption.
Home Equity and Other Non-Registered Wealth 
Another critical issue is the treatment of home
equity. In general, there is little controversy over a
methodology that expects a retired individual to
draw down his or her assets over the course of
retirement, transforming them into streams of
consumption. There seems also to be little
disagreement that the flow of housing services that
homeowners receive from their homes (imputed
rent) should be included in measures of their
consumption. However, many argue that homes
are special, and that it is not appropriate to
assume that retirees will sell their homes or
otherwise deplete their home equity. 
Our consumption-replacement measure reflects
a compromise. We include imputed rent in both
pre-retirement and potential retirement
consumption, and we include the amortization of
50 percent of an individual’s home equity in the
measurement of potential retirement
consumption. Figure 11 illustrates the sensitivity
of replacement rates to the treatment of home
equity. Clearly, different treatments of home
equity change the overall levels of consumption
replacement. The trends, both historical  and
future, however, remain intact. (For a discussion
of other assets and liabilities that might affect the
calculations, see Box 2.)
For a minority of individuals, inheritances are a
significant source of consumption. Since our focus
is on consumption financed by current and past
individual earnings, we would prefer to remove
inheritances from consideration. However, the
existing data do not generally allow us to
distinguish between assets funded by saving as
opposed to inheritances. LifePaths’ estimates of
assets, particularly housing equity, will partially
reflect the receipt of inheritances, which may bias
our replacement rates upwards. 
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Real-Wage Growth and Inflation 
We explore the sensitivity of the results to
assumptions for the future growth of real wages in
Figure 12. The base assumption is that, after a
transition period, real wages increase by 1.3 percent
a year. This is the base assumption of the Chief
Actuary of Canada in his latest report on the CPP
(Canada 2010). 
We test the importance of this assumption by
running alternatives with markedly different real-
wage growth rates: 0.5 percent and 1.9 percent.
Since we are comparing individuals’ consumption
possibilities in retirement to their actual
consumption during their working years,
consumption-replacement outcomes are only
modestly sensitive to assumptions for real-wage
growth, especially in the longer term. The trend of a
substantially increasing incidence of replacement
rates under 75 percent  persists regardless of the
assumptions about future changes in real wages.
Because inflation has broadly similar impacts on
wages, rates of return, and public pensions,
variations in the assumptions for inflation make very
little difference to the results. We experimented with
inflation rates of 0 percent and 4 percent annually;
the impacts were too small to show graphically.
Rates of Return on Saving
We show the sensitivity of future consumption
replacement in retirement to assumptions about
future rates of return in Figure 13.
The base assumption is that, in aggregate, the
future real market rate of return for the various asset
classes held by RRSPs and defined-contribution
RPPs will be roughly 4 percent. This has been the
historical average over the past 72 years. After
accounting for investment costs, and the individual-
level performance penalties implied by the aggregate
data on RRSP wealth in the 1999 and 2005 Survey
of Financial Security, the base assumption is that the
net real rate of return received by individuals in the
future will be roughly, in aggregate, 1 percent for
RRSPs and 2.5 percent for defined-contribution
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Figure 11: Proportion of Population with Total Replacement Rate < 75% by Treatment of Housing Equity and Retirement Cohort
Sources: Statistics Canada LifePaths Model and authors’ calculations. Commentary 317 | 17
RPPs. Individuals do not all receive these
aggregate net rates of return; LifePaths models a
number of sources of individual variation in rates
of return, including differences in portfolio
composition.
Sensitivity analysis was performed by both
increasing and decreasing the net rates of return
that individuals receive by 150 basis points. Note
that this could represent differences in overall
market rates of return, costs, astuteness in
investing, or combinations thereof.
Not surprisingly, consumption replacement is
sensitive to the net returns that individuals receive
on their retirement saving, especially in the longer
term (see Figure 13). 
Alternative assumptions about future net real
rates of return have the effect of altering the
steepness of the projected increases in the
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LifePaths does not currently model some components of savings and net worth that would ideally be incorporated into consumption-
replacement rates. Elements that are missing include savings and financial assets other than RPPs and RRSPs; non-mortgage debt; and real
assets other than owner-occupied homes, such as business equity and recreational real estate. 
These missing components will be added to LifePaths as resources permit. In the meantime, their absence is not considered particularly
consequential. Like the addition of home equity to the analysis in Figure 11, their inclusion will reduce the proportion of individuals in all
retirement cohorts with low replacement rates. However, it should do so to a much lesser extent than housing equity, because many
individuals have significant home equity at retirement, whereas far fewer  have substantial assets in these other, omitted sources.
Furthermore, initial exploration suggests that projected replacement rates from these sources will decline across future retirement cohorts;
their eventual inclusion in the analysis is expected to reinforce, rather than challenge, the findings presented here, namely, the projection that
the incidence of low consumption-replacement rates for future retirees will increase substantially. 
It should be noted that LifePaths does not currently model Tax Free Savings Accounts (TFSAs), a new tax-preferred savings vehicle that
has recently been introduced in Canada. At this point, there are not enough data to support the modelling of TFSAs or to make informed
judgments about their likely long-term impact on future consumption replacement in retirement. TFSAs have the potential to improve the
replacement rates of future retirement cohorts, especially if they motivate significant new saving, rather than merely serving as a substitute
for other forms of saving. 
Box 2. Other Assets and Liabilities Potentially Affecting Consumption Replacement in Retirement
Sources: Statistics Canada LifePaths Model and authors’ calculations. 
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Figure 12: Proportion of Population with Total Replacement Rate < 75% by Future Real Wage Growth and Retirement Cohort
Sources: Statistics Canada LifePaths Model and authors’ calculations. | 18 Commentary 317
incidence of replacement rates under 75 percent,
suggesting that retirement-income reforms that
increase the net return individuals receive can
brighten Canadians’ retirement prospects. Even
relatively large increases in future net rates of
return, however, such as  150 basis points,  do not
significantly reduce the likelihood of low
replacement rates for future retirees. 
Future RPP Coverage 
Although the specific results are not presented
here, future consumption replacement outcomes
were found to be quite insensitive to assumptions
regarding future private-sector RPP coverage.
That variations involving more or less future
RPP coverage in the private sector produced
results similar to those in the base case reflects the
relatively low level of RPP coverage in private
sector currently, and the fact that there is an
integrated limit for RPP saving and RRSP saving.
It also reflects the relative inertia of RPP coverage;
if, as assumed, decreases in RPP coverage
primarily affect new membership in RPPs, rather
than existing RPP members, it will take forty years
or more to be fully-realized in replacement rates.
Future Retirement Saving
The base projections assume that the future
retirement saving of workers will be consistent
with the outcomes and trends in retirement saving
observed in historical data, especially over the last
decade. The persistence of historical behaviour in
a population of workers that, as in our
projections, looks ahead and sees difficulties
maintaining their living standards in retirement is
open to question. We therefore tested the
sensitivity of our results to some different
assumptions about saving. For simplicity, we
explored scenarios in which, starting in 2011, all
individuals who currently save in RRSPs and
C.D. Howe Institute
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Figure 13: Proportion of Population with Total Replacements Rate <75% by Future Net Rate of Return 
in RRSPs/Defined Contribution RPPs and Retirement Cohort
Sources: Statistics Canada LifePaths Model and authors’ calculations. Commentary 317 | 19
contribute to defined-contribution RPPs increase
their annual contributions by 25 percent, 50
percent, or 100 percent. 
Higher saving affects both the numerator and
the denominator of our consumption-replacement
measure, since it lowers consumption during
working life and raises the income from which to
cover consumption in retirement. These impacts
combine to produce the results in Figure 14,
which shows a modest reduction in the proportion 
of retirees at risk of seeing a substantial drop in
living standards in retirement with the  25 percent
increase in these forms of saving, and more
substantial impacts with the 50 and 100 percent
increases. This last – and admittedly less than
realistic - scenario reduces the share of the
population that will have less than 75-percent
consumption replacement by our measures
considerably below the base case, but does not
stop it from rising relative to the current situation.
Concluding Remarks
In recent years, factors such as declining private
occupational pension-plan coverage, the financial
crisis, low household saving rates, lower long-term
real rates of return, the aging of the population,
and higher life expectancies have raised questions
about how well Canada’s current and future
workers will be able to maintain their living
standards in retirement. 
To date, it has been very difficult to estimate
how current trends might affect Canada’s diverse
population in the long run. In this study, we used
LifePaths – a sophisticated simulation model
developed by Statistics Canada which integrates a
tremendous amount of data on the socioeconomic
experience of Canadians – to project consumption
before and after retirement for Canadians who
have not yet reached retirement age.
Before discussing our main findings, it is worth
reiterating a few elements that distinguish
LifePaths from alternative methods of analysis.
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Figure 14: Proportion of Individuals with Total Replacement Rate <75% by RRSP/DC Saving Scenario and Retirement Cohort
Sources: Statistics Canada LifePaths Model and authors’ calculations. | 20 Commentary 317
Accurately projecting over very long periods of
time – some 40 years in this study – is inevitably
conditional upon the realization of key
assumptions about socioeconomic and
demographic trends. LifePaths is no exception,
but what makes LifePaths particularly valuable –
and useful in testing the importance of those
assumptions – is its ability to model time-varying
demographic and socioeconomic patterns on
diversified and representative samples of
population cohorts over time.
LifePaths also allows the modelling of family
consumption on an individual basis, reflecting the
diversity and variability of income, saving,
employment, and family situations over a lifetime.
While it does not encompass all non-registered
forms of saving, LifePaths does permit the
integration of housing equity, a key form of wealth
for the majority of Canadians, into the analysis.
Like Mintz (2009), Baldwin (2009), and
LaRochelle-Côté, Myles, and Picot (2008), we
find that Canada’s retirement system has
supported post-retirement consumption relatively
well, especially for individuals reaching retirement
age in the last 20 years. Since the 1980s, more
than half of retirees may even have seen their
standards of living go up in retirement – that is,
their consumption-replacement rate is higher than
100 percent (Figure 8). On average, public
pensions, registered forms of saving, and home
equity would appear to have allowed recent
retirees to maintain their average work-life
standards of living once they retire, and very 
few modest-income retirees have experienced a
significant drop. 
A look at the future, on the other hand, shows 
a different trajectory. After four decades of
improvement, the proportion of newly retired
individuals unable to replace at least three-quarters
of their average pre-retirement consumption from
the sources we model is projected to nearly triple
over the next 40 years (see Figure 9). If current
trends persist, by the 2046-50 period, about 45
percent of workers currently aged between 25 and
30 years  would not meet our 75-percent
threshold – a jump of nearly 30 percentage points
from those who reached retirement in the last five
years. For many Canadians, while this decline in
the proportion of retirees reaching the 75-percent
consumption-replacement threshold does not
necessarily imply an absolute drop in their post-
retirement living standards compared to current
retirees – our projections assume generally rising
wages and living standards throughout the period
– it seems fair to characterise it as a painful
downward adjustment. 
This decline in potential consumption
replacement would be felt across the entire
earnings distribution, including the bottom 20
percent, for almost all of whom it has been
standard practice to assume full consumption
replacement. In our base case, by 2046-50, nearly
one in five newly retired seniors in the lowest
earnings quintile does not meet a consumption
replacement threshold of 75 percent.
At the upper end of the earnings spectrum - the
top 20 percent – the proportion of earners who
might not achieve our 75-percent benchmark is
very high, exceeding 50 percent for those retiring
after 2025 and reaching nearly 70 percent for
those retiring in 2050.
These findings reflect the fact that, unlike the
situation experienced by cohorts retiring over
most of the past 40 years, when the sources of
support for retirement consumption we model
were becoming stronger, total retirement
consumption possibilities are projected to grow
very modestly, and to lag behind the future
growth in household earnings.
These numbers are large enough to justify a
conclusion that in order to maintain their
standard of living in retirement, many workers
may require a better balance between
consumption before and after retirement. How
they might achieve that, and how policy might
support them, is beyond the scope of this study.
We do observe, however, that since the prospect of
low replacement rates increases with each
successive retirement cohort, those currently in
their late 20s and early 30s have the greatest needs
in this regard. We also note that, since the
projection results vary substantially among
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generations, earnings groups, and sources of
income, no one reform option would likely be
able to  address every situation efficiently. Care is
needed in assessing how the retirement prospects
of various groups, including the time at which
people cease work, are likely to change in response
to various policy-reform scenarios. 
In short, our results point to an often claimed –
but up to now largely unsubstantiated – problem.
The level of retirement preparedness of a large
number of working Canadians, particularly in the
younger generations, exposes them to a significant
risk of lower living standards in retirement.
Policymakers and private pension providers alike
should direct their attention to reforms that can
mitigate this risk.
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